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1. THE AIM OF THE PAPER 
 
The abundance of argument types and reasoning approaches to ethics is a real jungle. An 
impression of the complexity of the various types of reasoning and argumentation of the 
corresponding theoretical issues is provided in Walton’s “Ethical Argumentation” 
(Walton 2002). To try to give an overview of this material here is illusory. Rather, I will 
focus on some, in my opinion, systematically central questions: 1. What types of good 
central arguments are there in applied ethics? 2. What are the main approaches to the 
justification of moral principles, and how useful are they? 3. How does the best of these 
approaches to justification, an instrumentalist, constructivist approach, work in detail and 
what argument types are used in it? The brief look at the first question serves only to the 
discussion, which is thus focused on certain aspects of justification in normative ethics; 
the article’s main aim is to sketch a systematic conception of justifying moral principles. 
In dealing with certain questions of how to proceed in normative ethics, the article in 
itself is metaethical: it provides criteria for good argumentation in normative ethics, but 
not yet moral principles. 
The following analysis of argument types and the criteria for their evaluation are 
based on the epistemological approach in argumentation theory, according to which the 
standard function of argumentation is to rationally convince, i.e. to guide an addressee in 
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acquiring knowledge or justified belief.1 The particular approach to justifying moral 
principles presented in the following is based on my previous metaethical work, most of 
which has not yet been published in English.2 
 
 
2. ARGUMENTATION IN APPLIED ETHICS – THE RECOURSE TO MORAL 
PRINCIPLES 
 
According to the most broadly accepted understanding, applied ethics should just apply 
basic and most general moral principles to groups of more specific typical cases or, in 
cases of singular decisions of great importance – such as the basic lines of a political or 
economic system or the determination of climate targets –, even to individual cases. If the 
moral principles are clear, this application should not be a problem in principle. (“In 
principle” here means that it is clear how to proceed – which neither rules out the 
possibility that, for example, very complex or comprehensive empirical information, 
which is not only expensive to procure and process but may exist only in very uncertain 
or vague form, is needed, nor precludes that evaluations from the perspective of those 
affected are very difficult to perform.) The two main types of applied ethical arguments 
conceived in this way are, first, deontic arguments for deontic judgments (about moral 
obligations) and, second, consequentialist axiological, in particular welfare ethical, 
arguments for moral appraisals.  
Deontic judgments are judgments with the deontic operators ‘(morally) 
obligatory’, ‘(morally) forbidden’ and ‘(morally) allowed’. Deontic arguments then are 
arguments that justify deontic judgments from deontic premises. The default case is that 
in a deductive argument a more specific deontic claim is derived from, first, a general 
deontic premise, second, empirical premises and, possibly third, interpretive premises (or 
lemmata) – whether the empirical situation fulfils the conditions of the deontic premise. 
In the present context it is decisive that the major premise of deontic arguments be a 
general deontic norm, ultimately – if one considers the justification of less basic deontic 
norms on the basis of moral principles (in the strict sense) – a deontic moral principle.  
Frequently the final, deductive step of a complex deontic argument is relatively 
trivial in argumentation theoretical terms. What is often more difficult is the justification 
of the empirical and especially the interpretive premises, as to whether a certain condition 
of the norm in question is fulfilled. In legal argumentation theory, there are several basic 
approaches to this interpretation problem. The two most important are: 1. What counts for 
the interpretation is the legislator’s intention – this approach can not be applied to moral 
deontic arguments, because there is no legislator. 2. What counts for the interpretation is 
the (moral) sense of the norm: Which (morally) desirable state is to be achieved with it? 
                                                        
1
 For an overview of the epistemological approach to argumentation see: Lumer 2005b. Some major pieces 
of my own account within the epistemological approach, i.e. the Practical Theory of Argumentation, are: 
Lumer 1990; 2005a; 2011a; 2014a. 
2
 The most comprehensive exposition is: Lumer <2000> 2009, 30-127. Further elaboration of the 
instrumentalist aspect: Lumer 1999; 2004; 2010. Motivational basis of morals and ethical justification: 
Lumer 2002. Preliminary work: Lumer 1995. On the instrumentalist approach in philosophy in general: 
Lumer 2011b.  
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Which (morally) undesirable state it to be prevented? The latter question already regards 
moral evaluations.  
Axiological (moral) arguments are arguments for (moral) value judgments or 
appraisals. Nowadays, the most broadly accepted understanding (and thus the underlying 
evaluation criterion) of moral value judgments is consequentialist, in particular welfare 
ethical (or welfarist). The moral value (or the moral desirability or moral benefit) of an 
object p is then an aggregation or function of the individual utilities of p for all affected 
by p. Therefore, in comprehensive welfare ethical axiological arguments, first, it is 
determined who are the beings affected by p. Second, the expected utilities of p for these 
various individuals is determined; this is done in practical arguments that ultimately list 
and evaluate the pros and cons of the assessed object p for the person concerned. The 
third and final step is really moral: These individual expected utilities must be 
“aggregated” to the moral desirability of p according to one of the ethical evaluation 
criteria, e.g. a utilitarian, an egalitarian or a prioritaritarian criterion. This final 
argumentative step is deductive. In the present context it is again decisive that this 
applied argument presupposes a moral principle, namely a criterion for moral valuation.  
As was just shown, the basic structure of applied ethical arguments is simple and 
easy to systematise in argumentation theoretic terms. But they always presuppose moral 
principles, namely basic moral norms or moral evaluation criteria. The real problem of 
ethical argumentation is the justification of the latter.  
 
 
3. ARGUMENTS FOR MORAL PRINCIPLES – SOME COMPETING APPROACHES 
AND SOME INSTRUCTIVE FAILURES 
 
The currently most important approaches to justifying moral principles are moral realism 
and value objectivism, methodological intuitionism, the game-theoretic approach and the 
instrumentalist, constructivist approach.  
Moral realism and value objectivism are theories according to which there is a 
moral reality of norms and values independent of the aspirations, motivations and desires 
of the moral subjects (e.g. Brink 1989; Dancy 2000; McNaughton 1988; Shafer-Landau 
2003). These theories have been criticized in ethics from both an epistemological and 
ontological standpoints: Moral values and norms conceived in this way are, e.g., 
ontologically odd entities that also are unknowable; and so far nobody has submitted a 
valid argumentative justification of realistically conceived norms or values (cf. Mackie 
1977, ch. 1). I will not repeat these arguments here. In our context, another criticism is 
even more important: the type of claim that moral realism and value objectivism try to 
justify misses the particularity of material ethics: Even if these theories were right, then 
there would exist just one more sort of layer of reality – in addition to colours, smells, 
shapes, sounds, etc., and theoretical entities (such as electrons, quarks, etc.), there would 
be also moral entities such as ‘norms’ and ‘values’. However, this would say nothing 
about how we should behave with respect to these and other entities. The basic question 
of material ethics is not: ‘How is the world?’, but: ‘What shall I do (from a moral 
perspective)?’, ‘How shall I decide (morally)?’ (Hampshire 1949). Value objectivism and 
moral realism overlook the practical side of ethics, its function of effectively orientating 
our actions. And this practical side means in particular that the material ethical 
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recognition of some morals must motivate the subject (to some degree) to accept and 
observe that morality. Ethics that are not designed respectively are pragmatically 
irrelevant; people do not act on such ethics; and, therefore, ethicists can ignore them too. 
In positive terms, this means: The statements of material ethics must be designed in such 
a way that, first, what should be done follows from them and information about the 
respective situation (informational aspect of orientation), and, second, that knowledge of 
these statements also mostly motivates to the respective actions (motivational aspect of 
orientation). I call this condition the “practical” or “motivation requirement.”  
“Methodological intuitionism” means here a methodological approach which 
bases the justification of morals primarily on our moral intuitions. Simple forms of 
methodological intuitionism accept (unfiltered or, alternatively, well-considered) 
individual intuitions; more sophisticated forms, such as Rawls’ theory of reflective 
equilibrium, try to develop an intuitively accepted coherent system from the various 
intuitions by reconsidering intuitions which lead to incoherence (e.g. Rawls <1971> 
1999, §§ 4; 9; Daniels 1996; other intuitionist approaches: Audi 2004; Ewing 1953; 
Humer 2005; Stratton-Lake 2002). In the most condensed (and therefore only thetic) form 
the main criticisms of this approach are: 1. Our “intuitions” are not primitive and natural 
psychological reactions, but the result of a lengthy, culturally, cognitively, emotionally 
and motivationally influenced ontogenetic development process (Lumer 2002; overview 
of some theories: Lumer 2014b, 27-29). 2. The recourse to one’s own intuitions is not a 
justification, but begs the question. 3. Since they dispense with any real justification such 
intuitions are fickle; in particular, they are in principle vulnerable to the challenge of 
obtaining new information of all kinds. – One important aspect of these three criticisms 
can be converted into the positive formal requirement: The justification of moral 
principles must be stable with respect to new information, i.e. the justification must be 
such that the practical and motivating acceptance of these principles is not affected by 
new information.  
Game theoretical moral justifications (e.g. Binmore 1994; Gauthier 1986) try to 
show directly, by means of practical arguments, that a certain kind of moral action is 
optimal for the agent. In particular, they utilise the fact that the individual benefits for all 
partners can rise through social cooperation. As opposed to the approaches to justification 
considered so far, game-theoretic moral justifications are real justifications: They show 
by practical arguments that certain strategies are optimal. They also meet the two 
previously established conditions of adequacy for the justification of morals: Game 
theoretical justifications motivate to comply with morals stably with respect to new 
information. Problems of a game theoretical-justification of morals lie elsewhere. 1. From 
the point of view of material ethics, they are very weak, only a minimal or business 
ethics, which for example do not protect the most vulnerable who have nothing to offer 
for cooperation (Trapp 1998). 2. Game-theoretically justified ethics of cooperation are 
structurally flawed in a fundamental way: They do not comprise any moral desirability 
function and no moral evaluation; thereby they also fail to provide the basis for moral 
emotions. Accordingly, in such ethics, for example, one cannot say that a collaboration 
was indeed rational for all parties involved, but was still unjust and morally wrong. 
(Lumer 2010, pp. 564-568.) – In brief, the flaw of the game theoretic-approach is that it 
ignores the goal or function of morality. In positive terms, this criticism leads to a further 
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requirement for the argumentative justification of morals: moral instrumentality: The 
justified morality must meet the objectives or the function of morals.  
If one wants to meet the practical requirement and the condition of stability with 
respect to new information, there seems to be no way to do so without the game-
theoretical justification of morals. This seems so because, if it has been shown that a 
particular strategy is optimal, then there is just no alternative strategy that can be shown 
to be better and to whose compliance we can be motivated stably with respect to new 
information. But this reasoning is fallacious. The point of departure of game-theoretical 
ethics is that it wants to satisfy the practical requirement in a too direct, individualistic 
situation-bound approach. It is asked directly: ‘What action is optimal in (given) 
cooperation situations?’ and then the respective action is prescribed (mere individual 
optimisation). Alternatively, this optimality can also be understood as a necessary and 
limiting condition which must be fulfilled in the end by a well-constructed morality. So 
one first constructs a morality whose realisation might also change the action situation of 
the subject, and also sees to it that, in the end, the observance of this morality is also 
optimal for the subject – but maybe just because the situation has already been changed 
(socially prestructured optimisation). In this indirect approach, it is then more likely that 
the demands of such a morality coincide with our stronger intuitive moral beliefs. This 
alternative approach is to be pursued below.  
Another, fourth approach to justifying moral principles is constructivist and 
instrumentalist: morality is a good instrument for fulfilling certain social functions (cf. 
e.g. Mackie 1977, ch. 5). This approach can meet the three previously developed 
conditions of adequacy. It is further elaborated in the following.  
 
 
4. INSTRUMENTALIST ARGUMENTS FOR MORAL PRINCIPLES – THE 
GENERAL IDEA AND ADEQUACY CONDITIONS FOR JUSTIFICATION THESES 
 
The initial problem for a conception of argumentative justification of moral principles, in 
particular with an epistemological approach, is the following discrepancy: On the one 
hand, rational arguments have the standard function of leading to knowledge or 
cognitions, i.e. justified beliefs, where the objects or contents of these beliefs are 
propositions, or more precisely: judgments (i.e. propositions with an assertive mode), 
which make up the argument’s thesis. This is the epistemic side of arguments in general. 
On the other hand, the objects of moral justifications of moral principles, however, are 
not judgments but moral principles; apart from moral principles one can also morally 
justify actions, norms, constitutions, evaluation criteria etc., which are not judgments 
either. Furthermore, apart from not being the right kind of objects of arguments (viz. 
judgments), the justifications of such objects should not simply lead to new insights, but 
also to the practical acceptance of these objects, namely to a particular motivation with 
respect to these objects. This is the moral and practical side of moral justifications.  
The simplest and clearest way to bring the epistemic and the practical 
requirements together is to design such moral justifications as arguments for a thesis 
about the object of justification, i.e. about the moral principle, etc. However, this cannot 
be any thesis; but the justification for this thesis must meet certain conditions; a thesis 
which fulfils these conditions is the justification thesis for moral principles. In this way 
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the epistemic requirement can be met by the fact that the justification still consists in an 
argumentatively valid and adequate argument which leads to justified belief, and the 
practical and moral requirements can be met by selecting a particular thesis about the 
object to be justified. Now my proposal is that the special conditions for moral 
justification theses about moral principles are identical to (or a superset of) the adequacy 
conditions already developed in the criticism of the alternative conceptions of the 
justification of moral principles. Hence the adequacy conditions for moral justification 
theses are:  
Adequacy Condition 1: Motivation or practical requirement: Moral justification 
theses about moral principles are motivating in the sense that if a prudent addressee (i.e.: 
an epistemically and practically rational addressee with certain relevant information) is 
justifiedly convinced of the justification thesis, he is motivated at least to some extent to 
adopt and observe the moral principle.  
Some reasons for the motivation requirement are: (1) The motivation requirement 
is the specifically practical component of the conception for justifying moral principles. 
The development and justification of moral principles are part of practical philosophy and 
as such should generally have a corresponding influence on the practice, lead to the 
practical and not only to the theoretical acceptance of the justified object. (2) Fulfilling 
the motivation requirement ensures the relevance of the insights. One could have 
infinitely many different insights about moral principles. The vast majority of them 
would be so arbitrary and irrelevant, that we do not even know why what they say should 
be a reason for the moral principles. Relevances are constituted, however, – leaving aside 
our feelings – only by a relation to our motives. (3) A justification which satisfies the 
motivation requirement has the pragmatic advantage that it can actually make a 
difference.  
Adequacy Condition 2: The motivating effect’s stability with respect to new 
information: The motivating effect of a justified conviction of a justification thesis is 
stable with respect to new information, i.e. it is not lost as a consequence of acquiring 
additional true information.  
Some reasons for this condition are: (1) Stability with respect to new information 
is the rational component of the concept of justifying moral principles. The only thing we 
can directly rationalise (in the sense of making rational) are beliefs, indirectly also actions 
and other things. And the two main directions of that rationalisation are: first, to make our 
beliefs true, i.e. to acquire possibly only true beliefs (or correct false beliefs) by observing 
epistemological rules and, second, to increase the number of true beliefs. The requirement 
of the motivation’s stability with respect to new information introduces the practically 
relevant maximum of epistemic rationality into the conception of practical justification. 
(2) Stability with respect to new information prevents the justification from being 
persuasive in a pejorative sense, namely that the addressee practically accepts the object 
of justification only because he does not have certain information. Stability with respect 
to new information here introduces an element of wisdom, wisdom in the sense of 
transcending particular and isolated knowledge toward a comprehensive knowledge about 
the basic questions of life. (3) Stability with respect to new information contributes to the 
longevity of the motivating effect.  
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Adequacy condition 3: Moral instrumentality: Moral principles for which the 
justification thesis is true, fulfill the function of such principles, they meet the 
instrumental requirements for such principles and morals in general.  
Some reasons for this condition are: (1) Moral instrumentality is the specifically 
moral component of the conception of justification. If the “justified” moral principles do 
not fulfill the function of morality we are no longer dealing with a justification of a 
morality. (2) As a consequence of their moral instrumentality the resulting moral 
principles correspond more easily to what we intuitively expect from morals.  
 
 
5. THE FUNCTION OF MORAL VALUATION: PRUDENTIAL CONSENSUALISM 
 
The next central question of this conception of the justification of moral principles is, 
what then is the function of moral principles and of morals altogether? And above all, 
how can we determine this function and again justify it? I see two approaches for 
identifying and determining the function of morals. One is idealising-hermeneutic, the 
other is technical-constructive.  
With the idealising-hermeneutic approach, one tries to determine the sense and 
function of the existing morality. First, one explores the general intentions of the morals 
of the moral agents, which have to do with the function of morals, in particular the 
intentions of moral reformers; or one infers from the make-up of the moral institutions 
themselves which function they might have. In this enterprise not all components of the 
moral subjects’ intention are interesting, but primarily those components that have to do 
with the intended purpose or the structure and functioning of morals in general, of general 
components of morality (norms, evaluations, virtues, etc.) as well as of singular concrete 
elements, i.e. instruments of this morality. The argumentative means to support such 
statements about the agents’ intentions are interpretive arguments in which the intentional 
causes of actions are reconstructed. The collection of such contents of intentions leads 
only to a series of fragments and often only to superficial ideas or even misconceptions. 
In the systematically second step of the idealising-hermeneutic analysis, the best must be 
filtered out from such intention pieces and then synthesised to complete ideals: Which 
conception of morality composed of such fragments of intentions is the best? Practical 
arguments for (amoral) value judgments (Lumer 2014a) are used for the argumentative 
justification of this last step.  
Idealising hermeneutical justifications of the function of morals flow smoothly 
into technical-constructive justifications. The aim of technical-constructive justifications 
is to create good instruments, thus in this case good conceptions of the function of 
morality, which are valuable to all moral subjects, and therefore are used by them. The 
argumentative means for the final technical-constructive justification of a function of 
morals are practical arguments in which the advantages and disadvantages of these 
functions for the individuals are presented and the best conception is filtered out.  
In order to be able to explain the further course of argumentative justification of 
moral principles, substantive results about the function of morals are required. There are 
some formal, structural results on the one hand, and real material results on the other. The 
most important structural results are the following. 1. The basic principles of morality 
are, first, the criteria for moral evaluation and, second, moral precepts or norms. The 
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relationship between these components which is technically most fertile and best adapted 
to the human way of deciding is this: First the criteria for moral evaluation are developed; 
with their help then in the next step all other objects of morality, i.e. norms, rules, 
institutions, virtues, etc., are instrumentally justified as being morally good, i.e. 
producing relatively much moral value. 2. With this setup, the question of the aim or 
function of morality initially is reduced to the question of the function of moral 
valuations, evaluation criteria and desirability functions.  
With respect to the function of a moral value function, so far I have to offer only a 
hypothesis about the purpose or sense of a socially binding morality, which – unlike an 
individual morality – is designed to regulate social relations in an intersubjectively 
binding way. The sense of a socially binding moral desirability function could be 
prudential-consensualistic:  
1. First, there is the consensualistic requirement: Socially binding moral 
evaluation criteria constitute a common moral value system that provides the 
intersubjectively shared standard (i) for assessing socially relevant measures, (ii) for 
planning social projects and (iii) for consensual arbitration of interpersonal conflicts of 
interest. In addition, for the individuals the purpose or sense of such an intersubjectively 
shared value system could be to procure a benchmark for self-transcendent ego ideals and 
actions. I call this quality of the desired moral value functions “subject universalism”, i.e. 
the value of all value objects (or more precisely the value relation of every two value 
objects p and q (= U(p)/U(q)) of this value function is roughly identical for all (or nearly 
all 3) moral subjects of the moral community. (Expressed somewhat formally: for (nearly) 
all moral subjects i and j and all value objects p and q holds: Ui(p)/Ui(q) ≈ Uj(p)/Uj(q).) 
So if e.g. for Adam the present well-being of Clara is better than that of Dora, the same 
should hold for Bert, i.e. for Bert too the present well-being of Clara is better than that of 
Dora. Subject universalism has to be distinguished from beneficiary universalism, which 
is the quality of a moral value function to include all possible beneficiaries of a value 
function, i.e. the objects to whose fate a non-neutral value in that value function is 
attributed. Subject universalism does not imply beneficiary universalism analytically, but 
empirically.  
2. Second, there is the prudential requirement: Subject universalism speaks of 
intersubjectively identical valuations, but what kind of valuations are intended here? The 
prudential requirement is that the subjective value functions to be compared according to 
subject universalism be parts or components of the subjects’ prudential desirability 
functions. Prudential desirability functions express what is good for the respective 
subject and hence rationally or from a prudential point of view should be the guideline of 
the subject’s decision; prudential desirability functions are constructed similarly to the 
utility functions of rational decision theory but with much stricter, philosophically 
developed standards, which also permit the criticism and correction of the subject’s 
present instrumental or even intrinsic preferences (cf. e.g. Brandt 1979, part I; Lumer 
<2000> 2009, 241-428; 521-548). Prudential desirability functions are intersubjectively 
different – that I have a headache is mainly bad for me and neutral for you, and the 
                                                        
3
 The exception that the intersubjective equality of valuation is not fulfilled for some subjects is meant to 
capture very special cases like psychopaths whose personal value functions simply lack certain 
components. Of course, such exceptions lead to particular problems. However, no empirically based 
approach would probably ever work without permitting such exceptions.  
 9 
 
reverse holds for your headache –; otherwise they could not express the personal good. 
Therefore, the subject universalistic requirement is not intended to refer to complete 
prudential desirability functions but only to parts (considering a certain set of value 
objects) or components thereof. What is a component of a desirability function? In 
prudential desirability functions the total desirability of an object p (for the respective 
subject) is consequentialistically conceived as the desirability (and in the end the intrinsic 
desirability) of its (p’s) various consequences plus the intrinsic desirability of p itself. The 
various consequences together with the way they come about are the different aspects of 
the value object, e.g. the hedonic aspect of bringing about immediate pleasure or pain, the 
financial aspect of altering the subject’s financial endowment, the empathic aspect of 
altering the person’s state of compassion etc. A component of a prudential desirability 
function is then a desirability function constituted of the personal desirability of only one 
particular aspect of the value objects in question – such as the immediate hedonic, the 
financial or the empathic component of the desirability function which evaluates the 
objects only in these respects. – While the consensualist, subject universalistic part of the 
conception of the socially binding morality expresses more directly the function and 
instrumentality of morality, the prudentialist part already accommodates the conditions 
formulated in the first two adequacy conditions for moral justification theses: (i) To be 
practically influential and to provide a chance of realisation, the subjective desirability 
functions the consensus of which makes up subject universalism have to be motivational. 
Prudential desirability functions are motivational because they rely on subjective 
(decisional) preferences. (ii) To be really in the interest of the subject and to be stable 
with respect to new information, the desirability functions should also be prudential.  
 
 
6. ARGUMENTS FOR MORAL PRINCIPLES – THE JUSTIFICATION THESES 
 
After this preparatory work we can now formulate the justification thesis about moral 
value functions:  
 
‘V is the value function which fulfils the function of moral value functions, and 
stably with respect to new information, motivates (prudent and informed subjects) 
proportionally to the V-value.’  
 
More specifically, if we fill in the prudential-consensualistic conception of socially 
binding morals, the thesis is:  
 
‘The value function V is prudential-consensualistic, i.e. V is proportional to the 
sum of all subject universalistic parts or components of the prudential desirability 
functions of (nearly) all moral subjects of the moral community.’  
 
The next step of the justification of morals is to enquire empirically, with the help of 
empirical decision theory and moral psychology, which desirability function fulfils the 
condition formulated in the justification thesis. This is beyond the topic of this paper. In 
other publications (Lumer <2000> 2009, 577-616; 2002), however, I have come to the 
conclusion that interpersonally (nearly) identical components of our prudential 
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desirability functions arise in particular from our expected compassion and our expected 
feelings of respect. Adam and Bert may e.g. expect to feel similar compassion for Clara 
who will have a severe headache as a consequence of an accident, where the compassion 
in turn is also undesirable for Adam and Bert. If this expectancy and empathic desirability 
can be generalised, Clara’s headache is morally bad. (Elaboration of a moral value 
function based on compassion: Lumer <2000> 2009, pp. 616-632.)  
So far we have dealt with the meaning, sense or function of moral value criteria. 
The function of all other instruments of morality, that is of moral norms, rules, 
institutions, virtues, etc., according to the axiological structural approach followed here, 
then consists in increasing the moral desirability of the world: they are means to the 
moral improvement of the world. The conception of their justification is straightforward: 
They are justified by practical arguments, which show that they have the highest possible 
moral value among the presently realisable instruments of this kind. The justification 
thesis about moral norms, rules, institutions, virtues, etc., accordingly is: ‘x is a norm (or 
rule, institution, virtue, etc.), and x is the morally best (or at least rather relatively good) 
among the presently realisable norms (respectively rules, institutions, virtues, etc.).’  
Again, applying this conception of the justification of moral norms etc. is beyond 
the scope of this paper. One remark, however, might complete the idea of the conception 
presented. The moral desirability function always is only one component of an 
individual’s prudential desirability function such that the motivation to do what is 
morally good often will be too weak and the respective action will not be executed. The 
key instrument for resolving this problem and for strengthening the motivation to do the 
morally good is social norms, i.e. general ways of behaviour that in a certain community 
are followed almost generally and for which it holds that if they are not followed, 
punishments will be imposed. If these social norms are morally good then the individual 
moral motivation plus the fear of punishment together may be sufficiently strong to do 
the normatively required; i.e. in such a structured situation it will mostly be prudentially 
optimum to fulfill the moral demands.  
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